Tuesday, January 16, 2007


Homeland Security and KY Train Wrecks

The Department of Homeland Security, formed in response to the 9-11 attacks, has concentrated almost exclusively on the sexier aspects of its mandate -- terrorism and border protection -- while giving short shrift to the more mundane aspects of general disaster preparation. The two train derailments in Kentucky in the last two days show the cost of such short-sightedness.

Yesterday's wreck involved butyl acetate, which is a potent solvent. Today's wreck, 20 miles south of Louisville has thus far resulted in the following actions:

  • A free-burning rail tanker car containing approx 30,000 gallons of propane, and 12-15 additional rail cars -- all burning -- containing a wide assortment of hazardous materials
  • A mile-wide "no fly" zone established by the FAA (which is a very unusual response to a localized haz-mat incident)
  • A one-mile evacuation of homes and businesses
  • The decision by authorities to allow the fire to burn itself out (instead of mounting an aggressive suppression attack to extinguish it)
  • Implementation of a state-wide emergency response plan on the part of state, county, and local governmental agencies and NGO's
  • Several dozen civilians and responders hospitalized with respiratory complaints
  • Release of hundreds of thousands of gallons of assorted hazardous materials into the atmosphere and/or groundwater
  • The admission that the combination of materials may result in unanticipated short- and long-term complications
  • Potentially significant financial losses (destroyed rail cars, fire damage to homes and infrastructure, business interruption, response and mitigation costs, etc.)

During an update on the news, various emergency response officials have said there was currently no idea how long the train cars would burn, nor how the hazardous materials involved would interact and the impact those interactions would have on subsequent mitigation efforts.

Safety and security professionals have been screaming for years about the sorry state of preparedness in the transportation sector. Yes, it is quite possible that al Qaeda might try to smuggle a "dirty bomb" into the United States in a shipping container, but -- once again -- we have seen that accidents are much more likely to happen and may create an equally large response need.

Yet the administration and DHS refuse to put sufficient time, effort, and resources into planning for the inevitable; rather, all effort is being directed to the relatively small chance of another major terror attack.

For example, the FY '07 budget for Rail and Transit Security grants has increased to $175 million, compared to the $770 million (up from $725 million in FY '04) for the High-Threat, High-Density Urban Area grant program (which is primarily terror-related). Preparedness funding was reduced by $14 million.

Other significant funding changes, with the first figure FY '04 and the second, FY '07:

  • Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention: 500 M, 375 M
  • Buffer Zone Protection: 91 M ('05, did not exist in '04), 50 M
  • Trucking Security: 22 M, 12 M
  • Metropolitan Medical Response System: 50 M, 33 M
  • Technical Assistance: 30 M, 18 M
  • Citizen Corps: 40 M, 15 M
  • Assistance to Firefighters: 750 M, 662 M

Overall, funding for preparedness programs in general were reduced from $4.44 billion to $3.39 billion.

Although the administration attempted to further reduce funding for both Emergency Management Performance Grants and Firefighter Assistance Grants, both were quickly defended by Congress, in large part because of the "all-hazards" nature of the programs.

The FY '07 budget leaves FEMA within DHS. DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff said, "The bill wisely reinforces DHS' ability to operate as a comprehensive all hazards agency.... DHS can thereby enhance FEMA's ability to coordinate response and recovery efforts." Unfortunately, we've seen with Katrina just how effectively DHS -- with their emphasis on planning for the last attack -- was in enhancing response and recovery.

Yes, preparing for, and responding to, terrorism are important aspects of an overall homeland security program, but when will the administration realize that terrorism is not the only threat to the homeland?

It should be obvious that one of the priorities of the 110th Congress should be to take efficient, cost-effective steps to safeguard the American population, based on generally-accepted risk-assessment procedures.

After all, what if the Zoneton derailment had occurred twenty miles further north... in the middle of Lousiville?