Some folks read Stephen King - I read GAO reports and get the same effect

Wanna know what scares the hell out of me?

It isn’t a few thousand bearded whack-jobs frothing with fundamentalist fervor, sporting a gigantic chip on their collective shoulder and entertaining delusions of taking over the world that are slightly less likely to be realized than the grand schemes of Pinky & the Brain.

No, what scares me is the pure, unadulterated incompetence at the highest levels of our kleptocracy.

In the last week, the GAO issued three reports on border security, terrorist screening, and aviation security that, read individually, are each cause for consternation. But read them together and synthesize the information, and you might be sorely tempted to crawl under the bed with a security blanket and a stash of Xanax until 1/20/2009.

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Border Security

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the governmental agency responsible for keeping terrorists and other inadmissibles out of the United States. They are charged with fulfilling this mission while simultaneously facilitating the cross-border traffic of millions of international travelers every year. The CBP conducts this mission at 326 ports of entry (international airports, harbors, border crossings) throughout the United States. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, nearly a quarter million ineligible individuals were interdicted by CBP and turned away, but the agency estimates that several thousand more were admitted to the country through our ports of entry.

Weaknesses that compromise border security include not verifying the nationality and admissibility of individuals. This failure of the system is the most acute at land crossings. When the GAO did spot checks, they found some checkpoints entirely unmanned. (For contrast: The state of Kansas is more vigilant about their turnpikes and that five dollar fee to travel from Bonner Springs to Wichita. I have never seen a turnpike entry point completely unmanned. Have you? Didn't think so.)

The CBP has been somewhat successful in identifying certain undesirables and inadmissible aliens, but the system is compromised by the vulnerabilities that let several thousand inadmissibles slip in.

Most of the problems highlighted by the GAO can be traced to a single problem: understaffing. Staffing shortfalls directly affect the ability of the CBP to carry out the anti-terror aspect of their mission. Progress has been made in the training of new officers, but no metric exists to measure the extent to which officers on the job receive additional training and exhibit proficiency in requisite skills. Officer attrition has further impaired the ability of the CBP to maintain budgeted staffing levels, and efforts are underway to curb the loss of seasoned officers opting to retire at relatively young ages.

Terrorist Watch List Screening

In the shock and horror of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the FBI was charged with compiling a terrorist watch list to keep tabs on known terrorists and individuals who were suspected of ties to terrorism after “standards of reasonableness” were applied to nominated individuals. The FBI conducts this work through the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which submits records from the watch list to screening entities, such as the CPB, law enforcement agencies, etc.

In the intervening time since the watch list was initiated, it has mushroomed to include records on over three-quarters of a million individuals. The list has led to approximately 53,000 positive matches. These matches have led to arrests, denial of entry into the U.S., but most often questioning and release. In a disturbing revelation, the GAO found that some of these positive matches occurred after-the-fact. Individuals positively identified and confirmed to be inadmissible to the United States had already boarded and flown on aircraft, or even been admitted to the country, and perhaps become untraceable.

The TSC sends updates daily to the various screening agencies, but in many instances entire records are not sent, partly because screening against certain segments of the reports might not be integral to the mission of respective agencies. The resulting “cafeteria updates” are often incomplete, inadequate or even missed entirely. In other instances, software incompatibility hinders the ability of some agencies to receive adequate updates of information.

Although the GAO found that some progress has been made in the promotion of effective screening procedures, both in the federal sector and the private/critical infrastructure sector, many potentially effective screening opportunities remain untapped. This situation is perpetuated because the government lacks a current strategy and implementation protocol for optimizing the terrorist watch list.

In addition to the lack of formal protocol, clear lines of authority, accountability and responsibility are missing.

Aviation Security

If you aren't ill at ease yet, keep reading. Aviation security, it seems, is an oxymoron. The GAO conducted spot-checks of United States airports, and successfully smuggled bomb-making components and detonation devices aboard aircraft.

After the thwarted attempt in Britain to make bombs from hydrogen peroxide, the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) made substantial modifications to the passenger screening process. Aimed at closing gaps in security that the alleged plot revealed, TSA agents set about confiscating perfumes and shampoos and sippy-cups and toothpaste from hapless travelers as they passed through security checkpoints at the airport.

After the new protocols were in place, a request was made for the GAO to test the system. To do this, the GAO attemptedc to:

1. Obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and
2. Test whether GAO investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the devices.

The investigators were able to successfully pass through screening checkpoints with bomb-making components and, on one occasion, an improvised incendiary device (IID), concealed in their carry-on luggage or on their persons. All of the component parts, as well as the items used to conceal them are commercially available.

In conducting the test, the GAO investigators used publicly available information, and determined that two types of device could be used to commit acts of terror aboard aircraft. The first was a two-component IED, comprised of a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. In this scenario, the detonator could be used as an explosive device in it's own right, or used to greater effect in concert with a volatile liquid. The second device was an IID that could be created by combining readily-accessible products (one of which is a liquid) that are banned from carry-on luggage. All total, the investigators spent less than $150 to purchase the components of their improvised weapons. Prior to testing the security apparatus, the components were tested for efficacy at a national lab in the summer of 2007. Prior tests had been conducted in early 2006, in conjunction with an unnamed law enforcement agency from somewhere in greater metropolitan D.C. These test clearly demonstrated that a terrorist aboard an airplane with the components in question could wreak havoc and endanger the safety of all aboard.

After the volatility of the components had been adequately established, the investigators set about devising concealment schemes, keeping in mind the prohibitions on liquids and other banned items. And two GAO investigators demonstrated the weaknesses of the security screening process in American airports by smuggling the components for multiple explosive devices and one incendiary devise through security and aboard commercial airliners, without being challenged by TSA officers.

Most of the time, the officers seemed to follow protocol and procedure, and employed technology in an appropriate manner, however, GAO was able to uncover weaknesses in the screening process and expose other vulnerabilities as a result of the exercise. Case in point: While officers generally followed the guidelines and enforced TSA policies, the investigators were able to exploit weaknesses in the TSA's own policies to get liquids through checkpoints. the investigators were able to exploit the weaknesses by studying public information and identifying the procedural weaknesses in the policies. (Details of a sensitive nature or that could otherwise be exploited by those intending to inflict harm were omitted from the report released to the public.)

GAO has submitted two briefings to the TSA in an effort to help the agency take corrective action, and suggested several actions that TSA should consider implementing in an effort to improve the passenger screening program. A system-wide review is underway, and the GAO is expected to issue a comprehensive public report, complete with recommendations for TSA early next year.

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As I said at the beginning of this post, any one of these reports would be cause for consternation and concern. But read them together and the picture that emerges is downright maddening. Not only are we not keeping proper tabs on terrorists and suspected terrorists, but our borders are as secure as your average sieve is watertight, and the GAO sent investigators into the field who were able to smuggle bombs-making components past TSA officers and aboard commercial aircraft.

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Chairman Waxman Has Sent Another Letter

Chairman Henry Waxman of the Committee on Government and Oversight Reform has sent another letter to the Administration. According to Chairman Waxman

* White House security officials have been blocked from inspecting West Wing offices for compliance with procedures for handling classified information. The White House has its own security office that functions independently of the Information Security Oversight Office in the National Archives. According to several security officials who have worked in this White House office, the Bush White House blocked the White House security officers from conducting unannounced inspections of the West Wing. This is a departure from the practices of the prior administration, which allowed these inspections.

* The White House regularly ignored security breaches. The security officers described repeated instances in which security breaches were reported to the White House Security Office by Secret Service or CIA agents, but were never investigated. In one case, the White House Security Office took no action after receiving a report that a White House official left classified materials unattended in a hotel room. In numerous instances, reports that White House officials left classified information on their desks went uninvestigated.

* The President’s top political advisor received a renewal of his security clearance despite presidential directives calling for the denial of security clearances for officials who misrepresent their involvement in security leaks. Under guidelines issued by President Bush, security clearances should not be renewed for individuals who deny their role in the release of classified information, regardless of whether the disclosure was intentional or negligent. Contrary to this guidance, the White House Security Office renewed the security clearance for Karl Rove in late 2006.

* The White House has condoned widespread mismanagement at the White House Security Office. According to the White House security officers, the White House allowed the White House Security Office to be run by managers who ignored basic security procedures and allowed other White House officials to do so also.

The letter was sent to White House Counsel Fred Fielding. You have to admit Henry Waxman is nothing if not persistent.

Of course, you can't expect anybody in the White House to be concerned with anything so pedestrian as security for top secret documents. They are just too important for such trivialities.

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President and Vice President, "Security Oversight, We Don't Need No Stinking Security Oversight"

Imagine you are a gun carrying member of the CIA, the United States Military, the FBI, the DEA or Homeland Security, and you know that you could end up dead if the wrong people find out the wrong information about your activities. I am sure you would take comfort knowing that the United States Government has well thought out security policies and comprehensive oversight. The Government has your back. All you have to worry about is the enemy in the front.

Imagine your concern when you heard that the Israelis and Saudis have close contacts with the utterly naive and hopelessly self-important neocons running the Vice President's office and with other neocons high up in the White House. Imagine the deepening concern when you read that well known Iranian spy Ahmad Chalabi, long the darling of the neo-conservative movement, had the ear of the Vice President and neocons in the White House. Now imagine the horror you must have felt when the White House and Vice President's office (and the highest levels of the State Department) leaked Valerie Plame's name. You must have been shocked to learn that for years the White House has been using the very insecure RNC as its email service provider.

How do you feel today when it is reported in the LA Times that the "White House says the president's own order on classified data does not apply to his office or the vice president's?"

If I were a spook, a policeman, a soldier or anybody else who could end up dead if the wrong people got the wrong information, I would be thinking about early retirement. What about you?

UPDATE: Blue Girl has posted her thoughts on this topic at BGRS.

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Safe Food? Safe Working Environments? That's Crazy Talk!

How ironic the Bush administration’s dual-sided approach to security is: you have a White house, on one hand, hell-bent on illegally wiretapping citizens' phone lines and throwing others into prison in the name of "national security," while, on the other hand, adopting an extremely lax approach to enforcing worker and food security standards.

This week another meat company is recalling 129,000 pounds of beef products in 15 states (including Missouri) because of yet another possible E. coli contamination. And U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) has introduced the Food Safety Act of 2007:

Spurred by deadly outbreaks of E. coli and other food-borne pathogens, a group of U.S. lawmakers is pushing to put all food safety oversight under a single federal agency.

[snip]

Currently, 12 federal agencies and 35 laws govern food safety, often with overlapping jurisdictions and different priorities.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration play the biggest roles in making sure the food Americans eat is safe. The USDA oversees meat and poultry, while the FDA is responsible for eggs and produce. (Interactive: How science can help keep our food safe )

The lines are not always clear-cut. For example, cheese pizzas fall under the FDA, while pepperoni pizzas fall under the Department of Agriculture.

In January, the Government Accountability Office added federal oversight of food safety to its list of "high risk" programs in need of "broad-based transformation." The GAO urged Congress to consider "a fundamental re-examination of the system ... before public health and safety is compromised."

Critics point to the FDA, in particular, as needing reform. The FDA oversees 80 percent of the food supply but receives only 20 percent of the funding.

"I call it 'Katrina on your plate.' You've got an agency, the FDA, that's understaffed, under-funded, without leadership, and it's not doing its job. And it's causing a real life suffering and death for people," said Andrew Kimbrell, director of the Center for Food Safety, a nonprofit watchdog group in Washington.

Sens. Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) have introduced a companion bill in the Senate. And it's about time.

Only one major safety rule has been enacted by OSHA since George W. Bush took office, and only after it was ordered by a federal court. The FDA has inspected only 20,662 food shipments out of the more than 8.9 million delivered to American ports. That's less than one percent inspected. Since 200 the number of food shipments has more than doubled.

This critical negligence is the result of the Bush administration's belief that new safety standards and regulations should be limited while old ones be rolled back to prevent the imposition of additional, cumbersome costs on businesses. Slash funds from essential oversight programs in order to pay for tax breaks for the rich.

While OSHA officials point to figures showing declines in both fatality and injury rates since 2001, critics dispute the numbers. Labor and health experts say those numbers severely undercount the actual numbers because the Bush administration has decreased the categories of recognized injuries, and because the majority of the most dangerous jobs are now done by undocumented immigrants.

Many have warned of the distinct possibility of terrorists successfully smuggling biological or chemical weapons in to the U.S. through the laxly inspected ports. But the increasing outbreaks of illnesses present a serious health crisis. And it is not beyond the realm of possibility that terrorists could take advantage of lax food inspection to attack the U.S.

"Security president?" Hardly.

[cross-posted at Lost Chord]

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