WMD: A British Report Applied to the US - Part III

POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES

What are the chances of a terrorist group using or attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against the United States? In the phrase used by almost every crisis management professional, “It’s not a question of ‘if,’ it’s a question of ‘when.’” Given the history of terrorist attacks on American soil – a history going back to the earliest days of the United States – it would be foolish to assume that we will not be hit again, especially in light of worldwide response to the American military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On a homeland security basis, we are woefully under-prepared. Despite the assurances of the US Department of Homeland Security, the government is not taking effective, cost-efficient steps to secure our nation. The Transportation Security Administration, a component agency within DHS, is completely incapable of securing commercial aircraft, never mind airports, the general aviation sector, and road or rail transit systems. The Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement units are charged with securing America’s borders, and are given billions of dollars for “high-tech” solutions, yet the best idea they can develop is a 12-foot fence along the Mexican border? The security postures of the chemical and nuclear sectors are riddled with holes, including proven allegations of collusion between inspectors and facilities to falsify “penetration test” results. Federal funding for terrorism prevention is distributed based on political concerns, rather than on a risk-analysis basis. The much ballyhooed “REAL ID” program – touted as a major security breakthrough – is nothing more than standardized driver’s licenses; as security expert Bruce Schneier has often noted, the whole program is predicated on the faulty notion of positive identification being able to identify a person’s intentions. Schneier also notes that DHS, by and large, is so busy “defending against the last attack,” they cannot effectively anticipate or plan for the next.

The medical and public health communities, which would be the first line of defense in a bioterror attack, would be unable to handle the expected surge of patients, nor would they be able to effectively distribute the severely-limited stockpiles of medications and vaccines that have been so pain-stakingly (and expensively) accumulated. Additionally, there are no plans for prioritizing administration of these medications, no plans for safeguarding the health and safety of medical responders, nor plans for caring for the families of responders (many of the police officers and firefighters who “deserted” in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina did so because they were evacuating their families, or searching for missing family members).

On a state and local level, things are no better. Interoperability of communications between emergency response agencies first came to national attention after the 1993 WTC attack, when it was reported that police, fire and EMS agencies could not talk to one another due to incompatible radio systems. New York City spent millions of dollars implementing an interagency radio system, but the radios went unused on 9-11, due to long-standing rivalries between the FDNY and NYPD. A recent study of communications interoperability conducted by the Federal government indicated that no major cities, and only a few mid-sized ones – have any sort of intercommunications ability available in disaster situations. Urban area mass evacuation plans – also recently studied by the US government – revealed similar shortcomings: the only cities awarded passing grades were those that deal with large scale evacuations on a regular basis, such as hurricane-prone communities in Florida.

Most businesses do not have business continuity or disaster recovery plans; many of the companies that do have plans in place have never tested them and hence, have no idea if they would be effective. Yet a well-practiced evacuation plan is critical to business continuity. After the 1993 WTC bombing, Richard Rescorla, vice president of security for Dean Witter/Morgan Stanly, instituted a comprehensive emergency plan, including mandatory evacuation drills for all employees on the twenty-two floors leased by Morgan Stanley. On 9-11, only six of Morgan Stanley’s 3700 employees at the Trade Center perished; those who died were security personnel (including Rescorla himself) who were assisting in the evacuation of other less-prepared WTC tenants.

Individually, we are also totally unprepared for another terrorist attack. Most families do not have stockpiles of food, water, and other necessities (which may be due to economic issues, a lack of concern, or other factors). Very few families have their own emergency plans, and fewer practice them. The families that do have “72-hour kits” and emergency plans tend to be the families of first responders.

What does all this doom-and-gloom mean?

It means that when a terrorist group – either domestic or foreign – decides to attack the United States, we will not be prepared. We will be unable to cope, whether on a personal, family, community, state, or national level. Panic will ensue in affected areas and possibly nationally, depending on the type of attack. Many may die unnecessarily. We will descend into a panicky, frustrated need to strike out; a lack of specific knowledge at whom we need to strike out may cause retaliation against innocent persons or groups. The political and economic impacts would be considerable.